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Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of
Public Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens
CORNELIA T.L. PILLARD*
As Lon Fuller observed, judges engaged in legal reform sometimes use legal
fictions to mask the fact that they are innovating. The legal fiction "brings the
reform within the linguistic cover of existing law" in order to "avoid discommod-
ing current notions" and to minimize the need for "troublesome adjustments"
to established norms.1 The Supreme Court's pathbreaking decision in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 rests on such a
legal fiction. The Bivens majority sought to ensure relief from those constitu-
tional violations that can only be remedied by money damages. Assuming that
the federal government would have sovereign immunity against damage ac-
tions, the Court in Bivens held that constitutional tort actions could be brought
against government officials only in their individual capacities. Individual
liability under Bivens is fictional, however, because the federal government in
practice functions as the real party in interest, paying for representation and
reimbursing the sued individuals when they settle or pay judgments.
The opinion was written by the liberal, rights-oriented Justice William J.
Brennan, and civil rights activists have long hailed the decision as a break-
through for the protection of constitutional rights. Even now, constitutional
scholars such as Professors Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer praise
the "genius" of the Court's decision to hold individual officials liable for
damages as a method of enforcing constitutional rights.3
Bivens has, however, proved to be a surreptitiously progovernment decision.
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, currently on leave from the Law
Center to work as Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel in the United States
Department of Justice.
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Although it appears to provide a mechanism for remedying constitutional
violations, its application has rarely led to damages recoveries.4 Government
figures reflect that, out of approximately 12,000 Bivens claims filed between
1971 and 1985, Bivens plaintiffs actually obtained a judgment that was not
reversed on appeal in only four cases. 5 While similar figures have not been
systematically kept since 1985, recoveries from both settlements and litigated
judgments continue to be extraordinarily rare. According to one estimate,
plaintiffs obtain a judgment awarding them damages in a fraction of one percent
of Bivens cases and obtain a monetary settlement in less than one percent of
such cases.6 The low rate of successful claims indicates that, notwithstanding
Bivens, federal constitutional violations are almost never remedied by damages.
The low success rate of these claims also reflects that the courts are processing a
tremendous amount of Bivens litigation. When analyzed by traditional measures
of a claim's "success" -whether damages were obtained through settlement or
court order-Bivens litigation is fruitless and wasteful, because it does not
provide the remedies contemplated by the decision, and it burdens litigants and
the judicial system.
This article argues that the Supreme Court's decision to place liability on
federal officials in their personal capacity-what Professors Fallon and Meltzer
call Bivens's "genius"-is in fact its Achilles' heel. Individual liability under
Bivens has become fictional because it is the government, and not the individual
personally, that is in fact liable in Bivens cases. The individual liability fiction
has ended up helping the federal government more than the Bivens plaintiff in
various ways, and has contributed to the low rate of recovery under Bivens.
It may seem odd to attribute the low rate of Bivens recoveries to the
4. By "progovernment" I mean here that the decision has benefited the institutional interests of the
Executive Branch as a defendant in constitutional tort litigation; this is not to say that governmental
interests, broadly construed, necessarily oppose recovery for plaintiffs who have suffered constitutional
harm. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. Except as noted, this article generally refers to the
interests of the government in the narrower, more parochial sense.
5. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Silberman, J.,
concurring), rev'd, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Federal Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 595 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 15-17 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 595] (statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (listing 16 judgments of 10,000 to that
date); Written Statement of John J. Farley, III, Director, Torts Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, to the Litigation Section of the Bar of the District of Columbia (May 1985) (on file with
author) (stating that only 30 judgments were obtained by plaintiffs and that only four were not reversed
on appeal and were actually paid); Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 343-44 (1989) (citing Farley and McGrath Statements).
6. Telephone Interview with Helene Goldberg, Director, Torts Branch, U.S. Department of Justice
(Aug. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Goldberg Interview] (Where the Bivens claim is accompanied by an FTCA
or other type of claim that appears meritorious, those figures would be correspondingly higher.).
Prisoner litigation is the largest category under Bivens, and it provides one example of continued low
success rates for plaintiffs. In the three years from 1992 through 1994, 1,513 Bivens cases were filed
against officials of the Bureau of Prisons alone, resulting in two monetary judgments and approximately
16 monetary settlements. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3 n.2, Kimberlin v.
Quinlan, 515 U.S. 321 (1995) (No. 93-2068).
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individual liability fiction, given that fictional reliance on suits against govern-
ment officials as a method of enforcing constitutional rights has an established
and successful pedigree in Ex Parte Young.7 The Bivens fiction, however, differs
significantly from the fiction on which Young relies, and it is that important
distinction that has created the opportunity for Bivens to benefit the government
at the expense of constitutional tort victims and, ultimately, the credibility of the
legal system.
The Court in Young used an individual-liability rule to grant injunctive relief
against state officials notwithstanding state sovereign immunity.8 The decision
depends on the notion that, while sovereign immunity bars a suit directly
against the government, officials who act unconstitutionally have exceeded their
valid authority and are therefore answerable, not as representatives of govern-
ment, but as private citizens. That notion is fictional not only because the
miscreant official acts under color of governmental authority, but also because
injunctive relief ordering prospective compliance with the Constitution
constrains an official's on-the-job actions, not what he does on his own time.
An injunction under Young therefore works just like an injunction against the
government.
Because Bivens suits seek damages rather than injunctions, individual-
capacity liability in those cases is not necessarily fictional in the Young sense;
when an official is directed to pay damages, the official's own personal pocket-
book is, at least potentially, at stake. It would seem that, from the defendant
official's perspective, personal damages liability under Bivens is all too real. The
fiction of Bivens instead lies in the predictable and actual consequence of the
individual liability rule: virtually without exception, the government represents
or pays for representation of federal officials accused of constitutional violations
and pays the costs of judgments or settlements. 9 The federal government has
become the real defendant party in interest in Bivens litigation. This article
focuses on the implications-doctrinal, economic, symbolic, institutional, and
political-of the maintenance of the individual liability fiction in the face of that
reality.
The relative merits of individual and governmental liability have been de-
bated in academia and in Congress, but the Court has remained committed to
Bivens's individual liability fiction to the point of ignoring its real-world impact.
The fiction has had various anomalous effects that generally undercut Bivens's
remedial efficacy and redound to the government's benefit. The notion that
individuals are personally liable-however inaccurate in practice-has sup-
ported qualified immunity and related doctrines that would be unavailable if the
7. 209 U.S. 123 (1907); see 13 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3524 (2d ed. 1984) (referring to Ex Parte Young individual liability rule as fictional).
8. Young, 209 U.S. at 161-62. The same principle has been assimilated to allow injunctive relief
against federal officials. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,
223 U.S. 605 (1912).
9. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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government itself were the acknowledged defendant. As an economic matter,
qualified immunity has meant that exposure to Bivens liability fails to provide
adequate incentives to prevent unconstitutional conduct, even while the nominal
availability of such suits burnishes the government's public image. Moreover,
with an individual rather than the government as client, government lawyers
who defend Bivens actions behave more like "hired guns" with a singular
mission of avoiding liability and less like public servants who would also take
into account the broader public interest in remediation of constitutional viola-
tions. The illusion of an opportunity to obtain damages under Bivens also may
well have relieved pressure on Congress to waive sovereign immunity and enact
a more comprehensive and effective remedial scheme for constitutional torts.
The Court's adherence to the Bivens individual liability fiction brings with it
substantial costs. The fiction has meant that the federal courts have not candidly
or coherently analyzed basic normative questions at the heart of constitutional
tort litigation. Those questions include: whether sovereign immunity should
completely bar constitutional tort damages against the government; if not, what
is the appropriate allocation of damages liability between the government and
its agents; and in what circumstances, if any, partial immunities should be
available to the government itself or to its employees. So far, the individual
liability fiction has contributed to keeping those questions off the table.
In an example of the phenomenon that Lon Fuller identified, the fiction of
individual liability helped change the law to permit recovery of damages for
constitutional violations while permitting the Court to sidestep the difficult
question of whether, when a constitutional violation occurs, sovereign immunity
should bar recovery of monetary damages directly from the government. As
Fuller also noted, however, legal fictions can obscure what is really going on.
The Court's evasion of the sovereign immunity question has buried an underly-
ing tension between constitutional enforcement through damages awards and
principles of sovereign immunity that bar such awards. The evasion of a more
candid resolution paved the way for a changing Supreme Court to undermine
Bivens's utility as a method of constitutional enforcement and has postponed the
development of a more frank and coherent legal approach to constitutional torts
and immunities.
I. THE BIVENS DECISION
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT DILEMMA AND THE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
SOLUTION
The familiar facts of Bivens are a reminder that sometimes damages are the
only effective remedy available for constitutional violations. Federal agents
searched and ransacked Webster Bivens's house, manacled him in front of his
family, threatened to arrest them, and later at the Brooklyn courthouse, strip-
[Vol. 88:65
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searched Bivens-all without probable cause.'° Bivens suffered a constitutional
violation for which he had no remedy. Bivens was never prosecuted, so exclu-
sion of evidence was not available to vindicate his Fourth Amendment rights."
Because he did not face a realistic threat of future harm from the agents'
conduct, injunctive relief would have been neither meaningful nor available to
him.' 2 Given the circumstances of the Bivens case, Justice Harlan observed that
"for people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." 13
The Court in Bivens confronted a tension between two established principles:
first, that for every right there must be a remedy; and, second, that sovereign
immunity shields the federal government from damages liability in the absence
of a congressional waiver.' 4 The Bivens Court saw the promise of a remedy for
every right in Marbury v. Madison.t5 The Court quoted Chief Justice Marshall's
statement in Marbury that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury."' 6 In words that resonate strongly within American legal
culture, Marbury underscores the centrality of remedies as a basis of governmen-
tal legitimacy:
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high
appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right. 17
According to Marbury's ideal, legal rights are not mere precatory or aspirational
statements, but remediable claims, redressable in courts, for violations of law.' 8
That is especially true of federal constitutional rights, given that federal law is
supreme and the Constitution trumps all other domestic sources of law.' 9 If
10. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971).
11. In any event, even evidentiary exclusion does not provide a remedy for an invasion of privacy in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Evidentiary exclusion is a deterrent mechanism, designed to
prevent law-enforcement officers from intruding unreasonably on personal privacy in their quest to
secure evidence. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). It does not provide a remedy in
the sense of making whole the victim of an unconstitutional search. See generally, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 (1994) (discussing distinctions
between Fourth Amendment exclusion and remediation).
12. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
13. 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes constitutional tort claims against local government entities, but such
suits are unavailable for actions taken under color of federal, as opposed to state, law. See Monell v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. 403 U.S. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
18. See also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1963) (stating that the constitutional
rights asserted "are not merely hopes to some future enjoyment of some formalistic constitutional
promise.... The basic guarantees of our Constitution are warrants for the here and now, and unless
there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason, they are to be promptly fulfilled.") (emphasis omitted).
19. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
1999]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
courts fail to redress constitutional violations and government officials are free
to ignore the Constitution without consequence, rights seem hollow to rights-
holders and the limitations the Constitution imposes on governmental action
appear false. The legitimacy and prestige of the Constitution and the govern-
ment suffer. Bivens therefore adopted the normative position that constitutional
violations should be remedied.2°
The Court also, however, faced the longstanding bar of sovereign immunity.
The principle of sovereign immunity is diametrically opposed to the remedia-
tion principle associated with Marbury. Whereas Marbury speaks of remedies
for legal wrongs as an important component of a "government of laws, and not
of men,",21 sovereign immunity is traditionally explained in shorthand terms by
the Blackstonian maxim "the King can do no wrong.", 22 Sovereign immunity
bars relief against the United States unless the sovereign, speaking through the
Congress, consents to be sued.2 3 Congress has not waived sovereign immunity
and invited claims against the government for damages to remedy constitutional
violations.
Faced with a right that could be remedied only by a damage award and an
established backdrop of sovereign immunity, the Court in Bivens found a right
to damages implicit in the Fourth Amendment itself, but held that the proper
defendants were the federal agents in their personal capacities, not the govern-
ment.24 Thus, Bivens gave effect to Marbury's ideal in a constitutional area
where there had previously been a remedial gap.
The Bivens decision marked an important step in the evolution of the judicial
interpretation of the Constitution as a sword rather than a shield.25 The Court
affirmatively rejected the traditional view that Webster Bivens's exclusive rem-
edy was state tort law. Under that traditional analysis, the Constitution properly
20. Whether constitutional rights require a federal damages remedy is a subject of ongoing debate.
Although some scholars have observed that Marbury's stated remedial imperative is less than absolute,
see, e.g., Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953), quoted in HENRY M. HART & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330-60 (2d ed. 1973), the Bivens Court
chose not to resolve the apparent dilemma by denying it, but embraced the remedial imperative as
requiring that damages be available directly under the Constitution.
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 107-39.
23. The doctrine was first discussed by the Supreme Court, in dictum, in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat) 264 (1821). Without questioning it, the Court applied "the general proposition that a
sovereign independent State is not suable except by its own consent." Id. at 380.
24. The Court emphasized that damages are a "remedial mechanism normally available in the
federal courts," and that they "have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 395 (1971).
25. See Walter Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv.
1532 (1972); see also Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969) (arguing,
before the Supreme Court decided Bivens, that remedies such as damages that are ordinarily within the
courts' competence should be available directly under the Constitution where necessary to implement
constitutional guarantees).
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entered the picture only as a limitation on the government agent's affirmative
defense that he or she acted under a valid exercise of government law-
enforcement power.26 For example, in the absence of a claim directly under the
Constitution, Bivens could have brought a common-law tort action in state court
claiming trespass; if the agents raised as a defense that they had a governmental
prerogative to enter his private home for law-enforcement purposes, Bivens
could have sought to rebut that justification on the ground that the agents lacked
probable cause and that the search was therefore unreasonable, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.
27
The Court in Bivens found that traditional approach inadequate. Justice
Brennan's opinion recognized that governmental power carries with it an en-
hanced capacity to harm and concluded that "to treat the relationship between a
citizen and a federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no
different from the relationship between two private citizens" would "ignore the
fact that power, once granted, does not disappear like magic when it is wrong-
fully used.", 28 In other words, governmental power is different from private
power, and the Constitution plays a special role in constraining and redressing
abuses of governmental power.
The Court, however, omitted any discussion of whether damages for a
constitutional violation might most appropriately be assessed against the govern-
ment itself, nor did it make mention of sovereign immunity. The Court might
have declared, for example, that in any apparent conflict between the Constitu-
tion and the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the latter must yield.
Or it might have held that sovereign immunity trumps the remediation prin-
ciple. 29 But instead, the Court neatly sidestepped the tension between sovereign
immunity and the remediation principle it had elaborated by holding the federal
26. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390-91. The Second Circuit in Bivens, subsequently reversed by the
Supreme Court, had reasoned that the Framers did not intend to create "a wholly new federal cause of
action founded directly on the Fourth Amendment[,]" but that "the medium [of enforcement] contem-
plated was ... the common law action of trespass, administered in our judicial system by the state
courts." 409 F.2d 718, 721 (2d Cir. 1969). The Fourth Amendment, in the Second Circuit's view,
"serves to increase the efficacy of the trespass remedy by preventing federal law-enforcement officers
from justifying a trespass as authorized by the national government."Id.
27. See Brief for the Respondents at 10-13, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (No. 70-301) (arguing that
common-law trespass actions, not constitutional damages claims, are the appropriate recourse for
Fourth Amendment violations).
28. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391-92. The Supreme Court, in contrast to the court of appeals, found an
affirmative right to recover in the Fourth Amendment itself, "regardless of whether the State in whose
jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize [under the law of trespass] the identical
act if engaged in by a private citizen." Id. at 392. It expressly rejected respondents' argument that the
Fourth Amendment serves only as a limitation on federal defenses to a state law claim and not as an
independent limitation upon the exercise of federal power. See id. at 394.
29. The Supreme Court has relied principally on common-law tradition as the basis for sovereign
immunity; the sovereign immunity principle "has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but
it has always been treated as an established doctrine." United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882).
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 545-48 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that courts
applying sovereign immunity "often have admitted that its justification in this country is unclear" and
reviewing justifications for and criticisms of the doctrine).
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agents liable in their individual capacities.30
B. FILLING A REMEDIAL GAP: THE CONTEXT AND SCOPE OF BIVENS
In its recognition of the importance of damages as a constitutional remedy,
the Bivens decision is not limited to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In the
absence of Bivens, a remedy would also be lacking for violations of many other
constitutional rights. The Bivens principle supplies a damages remedy for
violations of the First,31 Fifth,32 and Eighth33 Amendments. Bivens claims
include not only challenges to unreasonable searches, arrests, or uses of force
by federal agents, but also, for example, challenges to the failure to provide
necessary medical care to federal prisoners, or to the denial of federal contracts
or other governmental opportunities or benefits based on race, sex, religion, or
speech.
Before Bivens, there was no remedy for federal constitutional torts as such.
Congress had not specifically authorized damages for constitutional violations
by federal officials. Two federal statutes expressly authorized suits against the
government for broad classes of claims, which the courts had read to include
contract claims and common-law tort claims. The Tucker Act,34 enacted in
1887, authorizes judgment "upon any claim against the United States founded
either upon the constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an
executive department or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort. ' ' 35 The Tucker Act's exception for tort cases, however, excludes common-
law and constitutional torts.3 6 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),3 7 enacted
in 1946, waives federal sovereign immunity and allows the government to be
sued for certain common-law tort claims. The FTCA makes the United States
liable for "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
30. Even as the Bivens Court rejected the state common-law tort model as inapposite to abuses of
governmental power, the Court retained a crucial feature of the common-law model by holding the
defendant officials liable only in their personal capacities. The legal regime for recovery of damages for
harms caused by agents of the federal government is therefore anomalous: The Constitution addresses
abuses of uniquely governmental power, but constitutional tort claims may be brought only against
individual governmental officials in their personal-that is, nongovernmental--capacities. Cf. Penn-
hurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (referring to the "well-recognized
irony" that Ex Parte Young suits are simultaneously viewed as addressing acts of private individuals for
Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes and as dealing with governmental actions that thereby
implicate constitutional prohibitions).
31. See McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536 (6th Cir. 1996); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 794 n.8
(D.C.Cir. 1993) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 515 U.S. 321 (1995).
32. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
33. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1980).
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1994).
35. Id.
36. See New Am. Shipbuilders v. United States, 871 F.2d 1077, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("If the
government misconduct alleged was tortious, jurisdiction is not granted... under the Tucker Act.").
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2761-2680.
(Vol. 88:65
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circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.", 3 8 The FTCA's references to governmental liability only in circum-
stances in which a private person would be liable, and to the governing "law of
the place," have been interpreted to exclude coverage for constitutional torts by
federal personnel.3 9
Shortly after Bivens, in 1976, Congress authorized challenges-including
constitutional challenges-to any final federal agency action. Such suits may
now be brought directly against the federal government under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA). 40 However, damages are not available under the
APA; the 1976 amendment to APA sections 702 and 703 authorized only actions
seeking "relief other than money damages." 4 1 Constitutional tort claims for
damages therefore cannot be brought directly against the government under the
APA, but must be brought against the individual official under Bivens.
In a sense, Bivens also fills a "gap" created by the absence of a civil rights
statute, parallel to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, applicable to federal personnel. Section
1983 authorizes a private cause of action for relief, including damages, under
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
39. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994). Rights of recovery for common-law torts under
the FTCA are, in addition, quite limited. The FTCA generally authorizes claims based on "negligent"
or "wrongful" conduct, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), but limits claims for intentional torts to certain specified
torts (assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution) and
only when those intentional torts are committed by law-enforcement officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
More significantly, there is no FTCA liability for harms caused in the course of performing discretion-
ary functions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), and that exception has been very broadly construed. See
generally LESTER S. JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS (1999) (describing
FTCA coverage).
Although constitutional claims as such cannot be brought under the FTCA, common-law tort claims
may in some cases serve, and historically have served, as functional proxies for constitutional claims.
For example, use of excessive force by a law-enforcement officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment
could also be pleaded as a state-law assault and battery claim under the FTCA, and an Eighth
Amendment claim of denial of necessary medical treatment might be pleaded as a medical malpractice
claim. At both a theoretical and a functional level, however, reliance on common-law proxies is a
compromise. Such reliance does not give effect to constitutional standards, but depends on their
coincidental and incomplete overlap with common-law standards. It anomalously makes the Constitu-
tion, the supreme law of the land, depend on the contours of the tort law of the fifty states. The Supreme
Court in Bivens rejected the notion that, where damages are sought, the Constitution can only be
enforced through state common law. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; see also Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) ("It is no answer [to a constitutional claim] that the State has a law
which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."); id. at 196 n.5 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("It would indeed be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of
common-law rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which only a
state official can cause and against which the Constitution provides protection."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (noting distinction between constitutional violation and state tort). In Carlson v.
Green, the Court rejected the contention that state tort remedies under the FTCA are exclusive of
remedies under Bivens, in part on the ground that FTCA remedies are not in practice an adequate
substitute for constitutional remedies. See 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
41. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703, amended by Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
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the Constitution and federal statutes against state and local, but not federal,
officials.42 As it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, section 1983 is a
scheme of notorious complexity.43 For current purposes, it suffices to note that,
unlike Bivens, section 1983 authorizes some, albeit limited, governmental liabil-
ity.44
In sum, damages under Bivens are, in many circumstances, the only remedy
for constitutional violations. Various statutes authorize damages for factually
related nonconstitutional claims, and nondamages relief for constitutional claims,
against the federal government. Section 1983 authorizes constitutional damages
claims against state and local officials and local government entities. For relief
from constitutional malfeasance by federal officials, however, the judicially
created Bivens remedy against public officials in their individual capacities
remains the only mechanism for seeking damages for constitutional claims.
C. THE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY RULE AS FICTION: THE REALITY
OF GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
The critical turn in Bivens was the Court's decision to impose liability on
individual officers, thereby bypassing the thorny issue of whether sovereign
immunity should apply to constitutional claims or only to statutory and state
common-law claims. Sovereign immunity aside, it is debatable whether indi-
vidual or governmental liability (or both, in the form of joint and several
liability, for example) would be the best rule. Some commentators have criti-
cized Bivens's individual liability rule, arguing that constitutional damage claims
should, at least in some circumstances, run directly against the federal govern-
ment rather than against the individual.45
A range of rationales can be cited for governmental liability. Most constitu-
tional violations by federal officials are committed by employees who seek, at
42. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
43. See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (1995) (treatise devoted to
doctrinal issues arising in § 1983 litigation).
44. Where a constitutional violation was the result of the policy or custom of a local governmental
entity, the entity itself can be held liable for damages. Local governmental officials can also be sued for
damages in their individual capacities, as can state officials. The states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity, however, bars damages claims against the state governments. As with common-law sover-
eign immunity at the federal level, states' Eleventh Amendment immunity has caused constitutional tort
plaintiffs to sue individual state employees, who, in turn, have been indemnified by their governments,
creating de facto governmental liability. See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., LAW OF TORTS § 29.9 n.20 (2d
ed. 1986); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV.
47, 49-50, 60 (1998); Carlos M. Vizquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1795-96 (1997). The individual liability scheme at the state level is thus quite parallel to Bivens
and some of the conclusions of this article regarding the anomalous consequences of individual liability
are applicable to the constitutional tort scheme at the state level as well.
45. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 82-121 (1983); Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1484-92 (1987); Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign
Immunity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 634-37 (1982); Dellinger, supra note 25, at 1554, 1557; Rosen,
supra note 5, at 371-77.
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least in part, however misguidedly, to promote the government's interests; if
they are acting on the government's behalf and the government (or, more
broadly, society) is the beneficiary of their wrongful conduct, it seems only fair
that the government should foot the bill when its employees' actions overstep
the constitutional line. a6 Moreover, constitutional violations require state action,
and thus the government that made an abuse of its official power possible
should arguably be held accountable for that abuse. From the perspective of
creating workable deterrence, individual government employees may lack the
power or resources to bring their conduct into constitutional compliance, particu-
larly where lack of training, ineffective systems, or inadequate resources are the
problems; by the same token, only if government as an institution is held legally
responsible for constitutional violations will it feel pressure to institute prophy-
lactic measures, whether by enhancing staffing, improving training, or restructur-
ing procedures.4 7 Finally, if individual officials are judgment-proof, only
governmental liability can provide full compensation.
Others have defended the Bivens approach on the ground that personal
liability is necessary to provide sufficiently focused and effective deterrence to
unconstitutional behavior.48 And there is support for that view, too. If constitu-
tional tort damages are simply a cost of business passed on to government,
officials might lack sufficient incentive to comply with constitutional com-
mands. An official who risks paying damages out of his or her own pocket will
likely take more care to comply with the Constitution. Moreover, if an official
46. For example, when government violates the Fourth Amendment, it may be achieving law-
enforcement or penal gains; when it violates First Amendment free speech rights, government may be
benefiting in terms of controlling public debate or shaping its own image to its liking.
47. Professor Peter Schuck has persuasively argued that the deterrence potential of individual
liability on the part of government employees is limited "because so much wrongdoing is rooted in
organizational conditions and can only be organizationally deterred." SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 98. As
he described it, violations of law by government officials arise from a number of factors-including
failures of communication, capacity, motivation, and care-most of which are not within the control of
the "street-level" governmental employee who is most commonly sued under Bivens. Id. at 5-12.
Rather, the government must act at the agency level to communicate legal norms and induce employees
to follow them, allocate resources sufficient to support constitutionally conforming conduct, and reform
routines to minimize unlawfulness. To be sure, government is at bottom itself only a collection of
individuals, and only individuals can be deterred. See Vdzquez, supra note 44, at 1804. But governmen-
tal liability for damages is meaningfully distinct from the (unshifted) individual liability of street-level
tortfeasors because the former regime, by drawing on the public fisc, places liability at the feet of policy
makers, including legislators and supervisory officials, whereas the latter regime purports not to.
Governmental liability also differs from the (unshifted) individual liability of supervisory or other
high-level personnel, because the particular individuals a plaintiff elects to sue may not be those
ultimately responsible, and because even high-level personnel may lack the requisite scope of control
over the circumstances that gave rise to the violation (for example, the size of the agency's budget) to
have prevented it. See generally Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional
Torts, 85 MICH. L. REv. 225, 226 (1986) (discussing how constitutional violations can be "created by
structures and contexts rather than by individuals").
48. See, e.g., Janell Byrd, Rejecting Absolute Immunity for Federal Officials, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1707,
1718-21 (1983).
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acts unconstitutionally out of personal motives, it seems unjust that the govern-
ment, and ultimately the taxpayers, should have to bear the costs of that
individual's misconduct.
There is, however, a third body of commentary on the issue that suggests that,
at least from an economic perspective, the choice of individual versus governmen-
tal liability may not matter much.4 9 These commentators have not directly
analyzed the Bivens individual liability rule, but their insights are relevant to the
operation and effectiveness of a regime that places liability exclusively on
public employees and not on their employer. They argue that where the costs of
liability may be shifted voluntarily between employer and employee, placing
liability on an employee may be economically equivalent to placing liability on
the employer. If individuals are held personally liable for harms caused by their
employment, they will pressure their employers to cover those costs-whether
in the form of additional compensation, insurance, or indemnification. In order
to attract employees and to ensure that they fulfill their duties, an employer,
whether public or private, may feel compelled to shoulder the costs of employee
liability. Under this analysis, Bivens's choice to impose liability on government
employees is in fact a decision to place liability on the government itself,
because the government, as employer, will have no realistic choice but to
compensate its employees for their risk.5°The federal government's response to Bivens shows that the economic analy-
sis equating employee and employer liability has much force. The government
indemnifies its employees against constitutional tort judgments or settlements
(in the rare instances in which a Bivens claim results in a monetary liability) and
takes responsibility for litigating such suits by providing Justice Department
lawyers to defend its officials or by hiring private counsel with government
funds.51 Department of Justice regulations currently provide for representation
of constitutional tortfeasors for action within the scope of their federal employ-
ment, unless representation would be contrary to the interests of the United
49. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 249 (1987); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise
Liability in the Control of Legal Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal
Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 563 (1988). See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
50. The equivalence is said to depend on two assumptions: that employees have sufficient assets to
pay judgments against them in full and that the transaction costs of employment contracts that allocate
liability between the employer and employee are small. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 49, at 272. As
discussed below, it also assumes that there are no defenses (like qualified immunity) or other
liability-affecting factors (like juror sympathy) available to one (employer or employee) and not the
other.
51. The federal government provides representation in about 98% of the cases for which representa-
tion is requested. See Memorandum for Heads of Department Components from Stephen R. Colgate,
Assistant Attorney General for Administration (June 15, 1998) [hereinafter Colgate Memo] (regarding
liability insurance reimbursement) (on file with author).
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States.52 Where there is a conflict of interest, such as between officials who have
been jointly sued, private counsel may be hired at governmental expense to
represent individuals or groups of officials with common interests. 53 Regula-
tions also authorize indemnification of Department of Justice employees; employ-
ees of other agencies are covered by their own agencies' indemnification
policies.54 Indemnification is not fully guaranteed up front: payment will be
made only if the challenged conduct was within the scope of employment and
indemnification is in the interest of the United States.55 As a practical matter,
however, indemnification is a virtual certainty. 56
The pressure that the Bivens rule of individual liability imposes on govern-
ment to indemnify was foreseeable, and perhaps intended, by the Court in
deciding Bivens. Professors Fallon and Meltzer observe:
[T]he genius of the [Bivens] system's general outlines lay in the pressure that
it exerted on government ... to indemnify its officials and thereby convert
52. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a), (b) (1999). As a corollary principle, the Justice Department will not
assert any legal position or defense on behalf of an employee sued in his individual capacity that is
deemed not to be in the interests of the United States. See id. at § 50.15(a)(8)(ii).
53. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(10).
54. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c) (indemnification regulations applicable to Department of Justice
employees); see also, e.g., 13 C.F.R. § 114.110 (Small Business Administration); 14 C.ER. § 1261.316
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration); 17 C.F.R. §§ 142.1-142.2 (Commodity Futures
Trading Commission); 22 C.F.R. § 21.1 (Department of State); 22 C.FR. § 207.01 (Agency for
International Development); 31 C.ER. § 3.30 (Treasury); 32 C.F.R. § 516.32 (1996) (Army, Depart-
ment of Defense); 34 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.2 (Education); 38 C.F.R. § 14.514(c) (Veteran's Affairs); 43
C.F.R. § 22.6 (Interior); 45 C.F.R. § 36.1 (Health and Human Services).
If sovereign immunity is a bar to governmental damages liability and only Congress is empowered to
waive that immunity, see supra notes 23 and accompanying text, executive branch agencies arguably
cannot reimburse federal employees consistently with sovereign immunity. To avoid such problems,
indemnification policies have been promulgated agency by agency, providing for payment of judgments
out of each agency's appropriation. The government has determined that, as long as indemnification
"bears a logical relationship to the objectives of the general appropriation" for the agency, an agency
may agree to indemnify its employees out of its appropriated funds consistently with principles of
sovereign immunity. Indemnification of Department of Justice Employees, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
6, 8 (1986); see also Indemnification of Environmental Protection Employees, 13 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 54, 57 (1989); Proposed Indemnification of Department of the Treasury Officers and Employ-
ees, 15 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 70 (1991). The congressional spending authorization embodied in each
agency's appropriations act is thus deemed to provide the necessary congressional authorization. Other
potential objections arise under the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (1994), and the
Adequacy of Appropriations Act, 41 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1994). The Anti-Deficiency Act forbids the
obligation of funds not already appropriated. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A). The Adequacy of Appropria-
tions Act forbids the government to obligate itself by contract "unless the same is authorized by law or
is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment." 41 U.S.C. § 11(a). These potential obstacles to
agency indemnification of employees are avoided, too, by drawing indemnification funds from existing
appropriations, and by providing that indemnification shall be contingent upon the availability of
appropriated funds. See 28 C.F.R. § 15(c)(5).
55. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c); see also id. at § 50.15(a)(8)(iii).
56. A typical example of a Bivens case in which a public employee would not be represented and
indemnified by the government is one in which the employee is under criminal investigation or
prosecution by the government for the conduct that gave rise to the constitutional tort suit. These cases
are, however, extremely rare.
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what appeared to be a system of officers' liability into, for some if not all
practical purposes, a regime of governmental liability.
5 7
As a result of this foreseeable indemnification, individuals are not in practice
liable under Bivens. Although, as a formal matter, Bivens suits are brought
against individual officials, government lawyers (or private lawyers paid by the
government) carry out the defense in virtually every case, and settlements or
judgments are paid from government coffers. Thus, it is the government, not the
individual employee, that has become the real party in interest under Bivens,
bearing the burdens of suit and liability for constitutional tort claims.
The Court brushed aside the contention that it should treat Bivens as effec-
tively establishing governmental rather than individual liability more than a
decade ago on the ground that federal regulations did not make reimbursement
"sufficiently certain and generally available.", 58 The fiction is, to be sure, not
airtight. From the perspective of an individual federal official sued under
Bivens, the residual uncertainty in indemnification and representation policies
can be cause for concern. 59 However, reimbursement policies are now more
uniformly the norm among federal agencies and departments than they were ten
years ago. 60 Looking at the run of cases, the risk that an official who acted
within the scope of his employment would be left paying damages is negli-
gible.61 Moreover, in order to help assuage employees' concern that they might
nonetheless bear personal liability for constitutional torts, the government may
subsidize premiums on professional liability insurance for law-enforcement
officers and supervisory or management officials.62 In sum, it is now fair to
57. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 1822.
58. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 n.3 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)).
59. See Jeffries, supra note 44, at 51 n.17.
60. Interestingly, the Solicitor General pointed out in Bivens that, at the time, there was no legal
authority for nor any practice of reimbursing federal employees for judgements against them. See Brief
for the Respondents, supra note 27, at 28-30 & n.33.
61. In cases in which the United States has provided representation to the individual defendant, it
has not once failed to reimburse a federal employee for the costs of a Bivens settlement or judgement.
See Goldberg Interview, supra note 6; Colgate Memo, supra note 51, at 1. The Court's concern in
Anderson is also unfounded because the claims least likely to be covered by indemnification are also
unlikely to warrant qualified immunity, eliminating any argument that the individual liability/qualified
immunity regime provides more complete protection.
62. See 5 U.S.C. § 5941 (Supp. II 1996); S. 1298, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing to amend 5 U.S.C.
§ 5941 to require rather than permit subsidization of professional liability insurance premiums). The
newly available professional liability insurance provides constitutional tort litigation and liability
coverage for claims arising out of federal employees' performance of official duties. See, e.g.,
Acceptance Insurance Company, Federal Professional Liability Insurance Policy (on file with author).
The coverage provides for counsel in the event that the Department of Justice declines a representation
request and provides for payment of up to $1 million damages per plaintiff in suits defended by either
the Justice Department or the insurance company. See id. at 2, 8. The insurance company also provides
a legal information hotline to federal employees. Between 17,000 and 18,000 federal employees have
purchased such insurance. See Telephone Interview with John Hopping, Supervisor of Excess and
Surplus Lines, Wright & Co. (Aug. 24, 1999). Wright & Co. is the exclusive insurance broker for
federal employees' professional liability insurance. See id.
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conclude that, as a practical matter, Bivens liability runs against the federal
government, even though as a formal matter the named defendants must be
individual officials in their personal capacities.
II. THE STRANGE RESULTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FICTION
A. DOCTRINAL EFFECTS
Although federal officials do not in practice pay the costs of defending
themselves or compensating the victims of constitutional violations, the federal
courts have not accounted for that reality. The courts instead have taken the
fiction of individual liability seriously, acting as if individual officials continue
to bear the costs of litigation and liability personally. Notwithstanding the
arguments in favor of governmental liability,63 the Supreme Court has adhered
steadfastly to the individual liability fiction. From Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court in Carlson v. Green64 to Justice Thomas's opinion for a unanimous
Court in FDIC v. Meyer,65 the Court has defended individual liability as the best
deterrent rule.6 6
Taking the individual liability fiction seriously, the courts have used it to
support qualified immunity and related procedural barriers to Bivens claims that
bear substantial responsibility for the remarkably low success rates of Bivens
suits. Reasoning that individuals are differently situated from government, the
Court has provided individual defendants protections not available to the govern-
ment itself. The most significant of those protective doctrines is qualified
immunity, but from that doctrine stem related developments that have further
limited recoveries under Bivens. None of those doctrines is directly available to
government-entity defendants; indeed the Court's justifications of the doctrines
expressly depend on the notion that individual government employees alone are
responsible for defending themselves and paying damages under Bivens. Yet
because individual liability under Bivens is fictional, the defendant-protective
63. See supra note 46-47 and accompanying text.
64. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
65. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
66. The Court in Carlson rejected the contention that, when allegations support both common-law
and constitutional tort claims, FTCA remedies should be exclusive of remedies under Bivens. The Court
reasoned, in part, that "because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more
effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States. It is almost axiomatic that the
threat of damages has a deterrent effect, surely particularly so when the individual official faces
personal financial liability." 446 U.S. at 21 (citation omitted). Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, however,
critiqued the majority's assertion as an "unsupported assumption" and noted that the Court did not
maintain that damages "actually come out of the federal employee's pocket." Id. at 47 n. 13.
In Meyer, the Court rejected the claim that Congress's express, general waiver of the FDIC's
sovereign immunity made the agency subject to suit under Bivens. See 510 U.S. at 479. In the Court's
view, application of Bivens to a government agency "would mean the evisceration of the Bivens
remedy, rather than its expansion. It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the
officer, and if plaintiffs could sue the government, the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be
lost." 510 U.S. at 485.
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doctrines in fact redound to the government's benefit, virtually immunizing it
from liability for constitutional torts. Doctrines ostensibly designed for and
justified as protections of individuals, therefore, actually operate to shield the
government fisc.
1. Qualified Immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald67
Qualified immunity is undoubtedly the most significant bar to constitutional
tort actions. Qualified immunity bars recovery for constitutional torts unless the
defendant official is alleged to have violated "clearly established" law.6 8 If a
claim is based on new or uncertain law, immunity applies; if a claim is based on
clearly established law, it can go forward. Because of the common-law, case-by-
case method through which constitutional standards develop, however, and the
high level of specificity at which the clearly-established-law inquiry is con-
ducted, most fact-intensive constitutional claims can reasonably be character-
ized as new. A nonfrivolous defense based on the merits of a constitutional issue
will generally suffice to support immunity. As a result, qualified immunity has
proved to be a virtually insurmountable hurdle to Bivens actions.
The Supreme Court articulated the modern qualified immunity standard in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.69 While declining to extend absolute immunity to execu-
tive branch officials generally, Harlow reformulated the qualified immunity test
in an effort to make it a more effective shield. Under the prior test, as articulated
in Wood v. Strickland,70 a government official asserting qualified immunity had
to show that he had acted in subjective good faith. Harlow substituted a purely
objective inquiry, asking only whether the government official was alleged to
have violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights."' 7' In deter-
mining whether qualified immunity applies, the Harlow standard focuses exclu-
sively on the clarity of the law, rather than on the defendant official's state of
mind.
The availability of the qualified immunity defense depends on the status of
67. 457 U.S. 800 (1981).
68. Id. at 819.
69. Id.
70. 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
71. 457 U.S. at 818. The Court observed that the subjective good-faith element of qualified
immunity under Strickland had frustrated the purpose of the defense. See id. Strickland required the
official to show that he neither "knew [nior reasonably should have known" that his actions violated
the Constitution, and that he acted "without malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights." 420 U.S. at 322. Because the official's subjective intent was a factual issue, the official
asserting immunity would virtually always be subjected to discovery, and often a trial, if the evidence
genuinely conflicted regarding his state of mind. The official's difficulties under Strickland were rooted
in the fact that the burden of proof on qualified immunity rested with him, requiring him, in effect, to
prove a negative-his own lack of evil motive.
The Court in Harlow asserted that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-ranging discovery." 457 U.S.
at 817-18. Harlow's new objective test turned only on whether the alleged right was "clearly
established"; it therefore avoided the "substantial costs [that] attend the litigation of the subjective
good faith of government officials." Id. at 816.
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the defendant as an individual official; when government entities can be sued,
they are not entitled to assert qualified immunity.72 The principal justification
for qualified immunity is that it gives public employees the protection they need
to do their jobs with confidence. It stems from the concern that a government
employee faced with a risk of personal liability will be forced to choose
between bold execution of duties that might embroil him in litigation or
shirking his duties in order to minimize his personal risk. As the Court ex-
plained in Scheuer v. Rhodes,7 3 qualified immunity aims to alleviate "the
injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise
discretion," and "the danger that the threat of liability would deter his willing-
ness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by
the public good." 7 4 In addition, qualified immunity is intended to "spare a
defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily
imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit,",75 that is, the costs,
burdens, and distractions of the litigation itself.76 Thus, the objective of the
qualified immunity doctrine is to protect public officials from both ultimate
liability and the burdens of litigation.
Only because liability under Bivens formally runs against the individual does
qualified immunity apply; where government entities are the defendants, quali-
fied immunity is unavailable.77 In Owen v. City of Independence,78 the City
itself (as opposed to its employees) sought qualified immunity against a due
process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to give notice and a hearing
before firing the chief of police.79 The court of appeals dismissed the case on
qualified immunity grounds because the termination occurred before two Su-
preme Court decisions that clearly established the due process principles that
72. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
73. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
74. Id. at 240; see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.)), Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506
(1978). Qualified immunity as a defense to Bivens suits is identical to qualified immunity as a defense
to individual-capacity officer suits under section 1983. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 498-501. Qualified
immunity cases decided in both contexts are therefore cited here interchangeably.
75. Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
76. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
77. There is no governmental liability under Bivens by respondeat superior or otherwise. See FDIC
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1994). Thus, there is no Supreme Court case law on the inapplicability
of qualified immunity to the federal government, but the law of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 underscores the point that qualified immunity has been justified exclusively as a defense against
individual and not governmental liability. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662, 638
(1980).
78. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
79. The issue of whether government is entitled to the protections of qualified immunity arises under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that statute, unlike Bivens, authorizes local governmental liability for actions
taken pursuant to an official policy or custom. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
707-08 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112 (1988).
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supported the police chief's claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
only individuals are entitled to qualified immunity. Owen held that the liability
of governmental entities, unlimited by qualified immunity defenses, is neces-
sary to ensure government accountability, to encourage deterrence, and to allow
full compensation to victims of unconstitutional conduct. 80 Owen views loss-
spreading via government liability as justified even when the constitutional
violation is based on unclear law, because the public at large enjoys the benefit
of governmental activities that sometimes give rise to constitutional liability.
When individual officials are sued, however, the Court has struck a different
balance, deeming it to be in the public interest to protect officials who violate
the Constitution, even though doing so leaves victims of constitutional viola-
tions remediless.
The protection afforded by qualified immunity is a formidable barrier to
recovery. The Court observed in Anderson v. Creighton81 that the question
whether a legal claim is based on established law under Harlow "depends
substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to
be identified,", 82 and for purposes of applying qualified immunity, the courts
have chosen to identify constitutional rights at a high level of specificity.
Anderson rejected the notion that a mere allegation of, for example, a right to
"due process of law" is adequate to defeat a qualified immunity defense against
a due process claim, and instead held that "the right the official is alleged to
have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and
hence more relevant, sense: the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right."' 83 Under Anderson, the clearly-established-law standard of Harlow is
fact-specific and qualified immunity is correspondingly broad. As long as there
is *a reasonable basis for distinguishing the material facts that an official
confronted when committing the constitutional tort from the facts of prior cases
in the area, the official will be immune.84 As the Court itself stated in Malley v.
Briggs,85 qualified immunity broadly protects "all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law." 86
2. The Anderson v. Creighton Requirement of Specific Precedent
Although the Anderson approach may appear sensible in the abstract, in
practice it has barred constitutional challenges even to egregious conduct that
would otherwise seem quite clearly unconstitutional. The Court in Anderson
80. 445 U.S. at 651-52.
81. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
82. Id. at 639.
83. Id. at 640.
84. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985) (requiring only that, in a case of a
warrantless wiretap, there be "a legitimate question" whether an exception to the warrant requirement
applies to the facts at issue).
85. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
86. Id. at 343.
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insisted that "the very action in question" need not have "previously been held
unlawful,' 87 but in cases involving fact-intensive constitutional standards, Ander-
son has in practice required as much.
Decided cases illustrate how high the Anderson bar has proved to be. In
Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Board of Education,88 for example, parents of
two eight-year-old girls claimed that a teacher and a guidance counselor vio-
lated their Fourth Amendment rights when school personnel strip-searched the
girls twice based only on a classmate's report of missing a small amount of
pocket money and another classmate's contention that the plaintiffs were respon-
sible. The divided en banc court dismissed the case on the ground that the
school personnel were entitled to qualified immunity. The rule of New Jersey v.
TL.O.89 applied: school officials, unlike government personnel in nonschool
settings, are not required to obtain a warrant before searching students under
their authority, but their searches nonetheless must be reasonable under the
circumstances, and, in particular, must be "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 90 Strip searches
are plainly among the most intrusive searches, and a nonviolent theft of seven
dollars-unlike weapons or drug possession, for example-is far from the most
serious type of infraction that school officials confront. Under the TL.O.
balancing test, the repeated strip searches in Jenkins clearly were unnecessarily
intrusive. 9' However, the court of appeals held to the contrary, reading Ander-
son to require that, in order to defeat qualified immunity, the asserted right must
have been developed in a concrete, factually similar circumstance, such that
"pre-existing law dictate[s], that is, truly compel[s]" the conclusion that the
particular challenged conduct is unconstitutional. 92 Jenkins provides one illustra-
tion of how hard it is under Anderson to find that a constitutional right is clearly
established.
Similarly, in Rish v. Johnson93 the Fourth Circuit granted qualified immunity
based on a lack of sufficiently analogous precedent. In Rish, federal prison
87. 483 U.S. at 640.
88. 115 F.3d 821 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 412 (1997).
89. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
90. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
91. Indeed, at the time of the conduct challenged in Jenkins, the leading Fourth Amendment treatise
commented that TL.O. "at a minimum means that strip searches of students for nondangerous items are
unconstitutional." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 17 (3d ed. 1996). Every case that had upheld even a partial strip search in school dealt with a search
for weapons or other dangerous contraband and was based on specific information that those items
would likely be found on the student's person, and every case that had involved a school strip search for
items not posing any imminent risk of serious harm had held the search to be unconstitutional. The
Jenkins court, however, held that those cases were immaterial because they were from other jurisdic-
tions and therefore were not binding on the defendants. 115 F.3d at 826 & n.4.
92. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 823 (quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149, 1150
(1 th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). The Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to state that "[i]f case law, in
factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defen-
dant." Lassiter, 28 E3d at 1150. There are, of course, very few bright-line tests in constitutional law.
93. 131 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir. 1997).
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inmates claimed that the prison's failure to provide them with appropriate
protective clothing and equipment to safeguard them against infectious diseases
while they cleaned blood, feces, and urine from prison housing and medical
areas violated their clearly established Eighth Amendment rights. The Supreme
Court had established by 1992, when the challenged conduct occurred, that
prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights are violated by prison officials' deliberate
indifference to known, substantial risks of serious bodily harm.94 The plaintiffs
alleged that other prisoners were infected with HIV and hepatitis B, both of
which can prove fatal, and that their work involved risk of contact between
those inmates' bodily fluids and the plaintiffs' unprotected skin and mucous
membranes. Plaintiffs cleaned areas housing patients in mental seclusion who
sometimes threw hazardous bodily fluids, yet they were provided with gloves
only infrequently and were never given other protective gear, such as eyewear.95
Remarkably, the court held that the alleged conduct failed to defeat qualified
immunity: "[c]ertainly, no body of case law existed in 1992 addressing the
necessity of prison officials supplying protective gear necessary to ensure that
orderlies may employ universal precautions .... There was not a single legal
decision establishing that the conduct in which appellants purportedly engaged
was unconstitutional."-96 The court so declared notwithstanding a prior federal
appellate decision that overcame immunity on what the Rish court itself de-
scribed as "a similar issue.",
97
Another recent example of a violation of a constitutional right left unrem-
edied by the qualified immunity doctrine occurred in Wilson v. Layne.98 Wilson
94. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978) (noting that crowding inmates together in
isolation cells with others who had infectious diseases such as hepatitis and venereal disease was
among the prison conditions offending the Eighth Amendment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment).
95. See Rish, 131 F.3d at 1095, 1103 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting) (noting a defense witness who was
Associate Warden for Health Service at the prison acknowledged that "sound medical and safety
practices require that 'Universal Precautions' be taken"--including the wearing of gloves, goggles, and
medical face masks-by all persons potentially exposed to another person's bodily fluids).
96. Id. at 1097.
97. Id.; see also id. at 1101. The court of appeals distinguished the clearly established Eighth
Amendment right in Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 1990), on the ground that Fruit
involved unprotected inmates having raw sewage poured over them from above as they cleaned a well,
whereas the plaintiffs in Rish had feces and urine thrown at them by unruly mental patients. See 131
F.3d at 1097.
The court further concluded that there was insufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the defendants were actually aware of the risks to which the plaintiffs allege they
were deliberately indifferent. See id. at 1097-1100. But defendants' own witnesses acknowledged the
risks, and the defense instead turned on controverting plaintiffs' factual assertions that appropriate
protective gear was not in fact supplied-a genuine factual dispute that the district court could not, of
course, have resolved on summary judgment. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56. Moreover, the district court had
found that there were material factual disputes and denied qualified immunity, and the court of appeals
lacked jurisdiction on an interlocutory appeal to review the sufficiency of the evidence to raise a
genuine issue of fact. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995).
98. 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
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raised the question of whether federal officers executing an arrest warrant
violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights when they brought mem-
bers of the press unauthorized by the warrant into a private home without the
occupants' consent. The press followed the officers into the home of the
suspect's parents, whose son was not present, and photographed the father in
underpants and the mother in a nightgown.99 Settled Supreme Court cases had
held that, absent exigent circumstances or some other established exception to
the warrant requirement, a search pursuant to a warrant cannot exceed the scope
permitted by the warrant.'o Remarkably, although the Supreme Court in Wilson
unanimously held that the press intrusion into the house did run afoul of the
Court's own Fourth Amendment precedent, the Court nonetheless held that the
officers were immunized in light of Anderson. The Court concluded that it was
"not obvious from the general principles of the Fourth Amendment that the
conduct of the officers in this case violated the Amendment." 101
The defendants never argued in these cases that their conduct actually was
constitutional, but only that any rights they violated were not clearly estab-
lished. Indeed, as the unanimity of the Supreme Court's decision on the merits
of the Fourth Amendment issue in Wilson vividly illustrates, very'strong legal
claims may fail solely because of qualified immunity. It is similarly difficult to
imagine that the courts in Rish or Jenkins would have found no liability in the
absence of qualified immunity. It is the individual liability fiction, and the
qualified immunity defense that the fiction invokes, that accounts for the lack of
recovery in cases like these.
3. Interlocutory Appeals Pursuant to Mitchell v. Forsyth10 2 and Behrens v.
Pelletier'0
3
An outgrowth of the qualified immunity doctrine that is also predicated on
the individual liability fiction is the judicial decision to allow defendant individu-
als to assert qualified immunity repeatedly at different procedural stages of a
case and to take an interlocutory appeal from any order denying such immunity.
Government entities, in contrast, are bound by the final-judgment rule, which
generally bars interlocutory appeals. This doctrine, by allowing repeated oppor-
tunities to seek qualified immunity from different judges, and by creating the
potential for lengthy delays, poses another substantial obstacle to relief in
Bivens actions.
In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court held that qualified immunity is not
only a defense against ultimate liability, but confers a right not to stand trial that
99. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 113 (4th Cir. 1998).
100. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697-98 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990);
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987)).
101. Id. at 1700. Justice Stevens alone dissented from the qualified immunity holding. See id. at
1701-04.
102. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
103. 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
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justifies an exception to the final-judgment rule for orders denying qualified
immunity.' °4 Thus, in the few cases in which district courts determine that
Harlow does not bar recovery, the defendant officials are entitled to seek
immediate review in the courts of appeals. Only if a court of appeals also
determines that the plaintiff's claim is not based on new law may the litigation
proceed in the trial court.
Interlocutory appeals are available to individual constitutional tort defendants
based on the same rationale that underlies Harlow's qualified immunity stan-
dard: government officials may be torn between official duty and personal
interest, not only by the risk of liability, but also by the burdens of litigation.
The interlocutory-appeal right is extended to individuals because they are sued
in their individual capacities. That protection would not apply to the federal
government were it the defendant in Bivens actions. 1
0 5
The availability under Behrens v. Pelletier of repeat opportunities for defen-
dant officials to appeal denials of immunity before a case even reaches a final
judgment in the trial court enhances the likelihood that immunity will be
found. 10 6 Perhaps more importantly, multiple appeals are a potent defense tool
even where immunity is not ultimately recognized, because trial court proceed-
ings are stayed while immunity appeals are pending, and many years of delay
from appeals can effectively defeat even meritorious claims. '
0 7
4. Heightened Pleading Requirements
Another doctrine deriving from qualified immunity and depending on the
individual liability fiction, heightened pleading, bars relief for constitutional
claims that have a state-of-mind element. Courts of appeals have embraced
heightened pleading standards in response to Harlow's perceived deficiency in
resolving allegations premised on unconstitutional intent. For example, it is
clearly established, generally without much regard to factual context, that
official actions taken with a racially discriminatory intent, or actions taken in
retaliation for political speech, are unconstitutional. Disputes in such cases tend
to turn not on whether the complaint states a violation of established constitu-
tional rights but on whether the alleged state of mind can be proved. In such
circumstances, claims cannot be dismissed at the outset of the litigation under
Harlow's objective, clearly-established-law standard. Constitutional claims with
state-of-mind requirements present "the danger that plaintiffs might allege facts
104. 472 U.S. at 524-30.
105. The final judgment rule generally bars interlocutory appeals, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the
exception for appeals from orders denying qualified immunity established by Mitchell does not extend
to governmental entities, which are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Swint v. Chambers City
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 41-43 (1995) (appellate courts have interlocutory jurisdiction only over claims
of individual, and not governmental entity, defendants).
106. 516 U.S. at 299.
107. For example, by the time the Supreme Court decided the appealability issue in Berhens itself,
the parties had spent more than four years litigating interlocutory appeals. Id. at 321 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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consistent with lawful conduct and append a claim of unconstitutional motive,
thus imposing on officials the very costs and burdens of discovery and possibly
trial that Harlow intended to spare them." 
108
The courts of appeals have addressed this issue by adopting heightened
pleading standards for intent-based constitutional tort claims against govern-
ment officials in an attempt to protect the officials from the burden of litigating
what might ultimately be baseless or insubstantial claims. For example, in a
typical articulation of the heightened pleading requirement, the Ninth Circuit
has held that "a plaintiff must put forward nonconclusory allegations of subjec-
tive motivation, supported either by direct or circumstantial evidence, before
discovery may be had." 1 09
Like Harlow's new-law standard, the heightened pleading requirement is
inapplicable to claims against government itself; its application in Bivens suits
thus depends on the individual liability fiction. Heightened pleading is a protec-
tion only available to individual defendants, as it follows from their entitlement
108. Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1990), affd, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). Harlow and
heightened pleading actually deal with two very different problems. Harlow is concerned with
providing clear notice to government employees of the types of conduct for which they may be held
liable in damages and with relieving them of liability where governing legal standards are murky.
Harlow therefore assumes that the challenged conduct occurred and provides immunity against claims
that are legally marginal. The heightened pleading cases, in contrast, address claims that may be
viewed, at least before discovery, as factually marginal. Heightened pleading, therefore, assumes the
clarity of the law, but tries to discern at an early stage in the litigation whether, as a factual matter, there
is a strong chance that an unconstitutional motive was present. The implications of making a
preliminary factual determination before discovery are quite different from-and more problematic
than-the implications of making an early determination of a purely legal issue.
109. Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (plaintiffs must make "specific, nonconclusory factual allegations which
establish [the necessary mental state], or face dismissal"); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir.
1995) (en banc) (complaint must "do more than allege conclusions," and "the district court need not
allow any discovery unless it finds that plaintiff has supported his claim with sufficient precision and
factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of defendant's conduct at the time of the
alleged acts"); Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1991) ("unless the plaintiff has the
kernel of a case in hand"-that is, "specific, nonconclusory allegations which establish the necessary
mental state"-"the defendant wins on immunity grounds in advance of discovery"); Dunbar Corp. v.
Lindsey, 905 F.2d 754, 763-64 (4th Cir. 1990) ("We agree ... that a 'heightened pleading standard' is
highly appropriate in actions against government officials."). But see Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d
813, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (questioning the need for heightened pleading, because "we do not see why
the limit on discovery and the [clear and convincing] standard of proof" that the circuit imposed on
individual-capacity suits subject to qualified immunity "would not adequately fulfill the implications of
Harlow"), rev'd, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (rejecting clear and convincing evidence requirement). For a
discussion of the D.C. Circuit's unique approach, see infra note 116.
The Fifth Circuit has pointed out that heightened pleading in the qualified immunity context is a
misnomer. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434; see also Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 794 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (en banc), vacated, 515 U.S. 321 (1995); Elliott, 937 F.2d at 345. Qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense, and a requirement that allegations be made with heightened specificity in order to
defeat that defense cannot be imposed at the initial pleading stage, before the qualified immunity
defense has been asserted. The Fifth Circuit has therefore held that district courts in individual-capacity
suits in which a qualified immunity defense has been raised should require plaintiffs who have not
pleaded with heightened specificity to do so in a reply to the defendant's answer under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 7(a). See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
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to assert qualified immunity. Several circuits originally had adopted heightened
pleading standards applicable to constitutional tort claims, including, signifi-
cantly, section 1983 claims against government entities. However, in 1993, the
Supreme Court in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unitti ° unanimously rejected requirements of heightened pleading
for civil rights claims against government entities on the ground that such
special rules conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b).'" The
Leatherman court expressly reserved, however, the question of whether the
same logic applies to individual-capacity suits, in which qualified immunity
may be a defense." 2 The Court suggested that its qualified immunity jurispru-
dence might "require a heightened pleading in cases involving government
officials.""11 3 Notwithstanding the persuasive force of Leatherman's rationale
even in individual-capacity suits, every circuit that has considered the question
since Leatherman has continued to apply heightened pleading requirements to
the state-of-mind elements of claims against individual officials. 1
4
The continued vitality of judicially fashioned heightened pleading require-
ments was called into doubt most recently by the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford-El v. Britton,'"5 but the courts of appeals nonetheless continue to
employ them. The District of Columbia Circuit in Crawford-El developed a
unique approach to motive-based constitutional tort claims, going a step further
than the heightened-pleading approach of other circuits to require that plaintiffs
raising motive-based constitutional claims establish defendants' motives by
clear and convincing evidence."16 The Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Cir-
110. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
111. The Court reasoned that, because Rule 9(b) imposes a requirement of heightened particularity
only in two specified contexts-claims of fraud or mistake-and does not similarly impose such a
requirement on claims of municipal liability under section 1983, civil rights claims are governed by the
Rule 8(a)(2) regime of "notice pleading." 507 U.S. at 167.
112. See id. at 166-67.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Babb v. Dornan, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994); Schultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112,
1115 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994), affid en banc, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449,
455-57 (9th Cir. 1994); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 339 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994).
115. 523 U.S. 574 (1998). Because the Court addressed the issue only directly in dicta, lower courts
have continued to adhere to their own heightened pleading standards. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of
County Comm'rs of Fairfield County, No. 97-3107, 1998 WL 321045, at *2 n.5 (6th Cir. 1998); Ross v.
State, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1191 n.10 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Helton v. Hawkins, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280
(M.D. Ala. 1998).
116. Before its en bane decision in Crawford-El, the D.C. Circuit required that, where an individual-
capacity constitutional tort claim turned on an allegation of improper motive, the facts be supported by
"specific direct evidence" of such motive. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en
banc), vacated, 515 U.S. 321 (1995). The direct evidence rule prevented discovery and trial on all
motive-based constitutional tort claims in the D.C. Circuit over a period of 10 years. See Crawford-El,
93 F.3d at 833 (Silberman, J., concurring). The direct evidence rule came under broad attack and
appeared indefensible in view of the Supreme Court's holding in Holland v. United States that
"circumstantial evidence ... is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence." 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235-36 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The D.C.
Circuit, sitting en bane in Crawford-El, thus abandoned the direct evidence rule in favor of a
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cuit's higher burden of proof on the ground that it was not authorized by the
holding or logic of Harlow, and that, to the extent that the circuit sought to limit
discovery in actions that require proof of motive, such issues "are most
frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the
legislative process." 17 The Court's reasoning suggests that judicially fashioned
heightened pleading standards are equally invalid.1 8 However, the Crawford-El
Court approved the "firm application" of the existing Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in individual-capacity constitutional tort actions, inviting district
courts to "insist that the plaintiff 'put forward specific, nonconclusory factual
allegations' that establish improper motive causing cognizable injury in order to
survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal."" 9 Lower courts continued to
require heightened pleading even after Leathennan seemed to cut the logical
ground out from under such requirements; it would not be surprising if courts
now relied on Crawford-El's reference to specific allegations to justify continu-
ing to do so.
Heightened pleading has imposed a significant barrier to recovery under
Bivens, requiring dismissal of constitutional tort claims where the victim cannot
plead unconstitutional state of mind with particularity. To be sure, judging by its
recent inhospitable response to heightened proof standards, the Supreme Court
may eventually reduce if not entirely eliminate the disparity between pleading
requirements in Bivens suits and in other areas. In the meantime, however,
heightened pleading requirements have been an especially troublesome hurdle
for Bivens plaintiffs. Evidence of state of mind is usually in the hands of the
defendant, and specifics are difficult to plead before discovery is had. Thus, by
its very character a heightened pleading requirement raises the bar on recovery
in a way that screens out some meritorious cases. In practice, it appears that
heightened pleading requirements have been met in only one Bivens case in
clear-and-convincing standard of proof, instead of the usual preponderance standard, for state-of-mind
elements of constitutional tort claims against individual government officials. See 93 F.3d at 815. The
circuit also limited discovery in individual-capacity constitutional tort suits, holding that summary
judgment may be granted against the plaintiff without affording any opportunity for discovery "unless
the plaintiff can establish, based upon such evidence as he may have without the benefit of discovery
and any facts to which he can credibly attest, a reasonable likelihood that he would discover evidence
sufficient to support his specific factual allegations regarding the defendant's motive." Id. at 841
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). The circuit apparently also abandoned its heightened pleading standard, see,
e.g., Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 E3d 1524, 1530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1994), as unnecessary in view
of the restrictions applicable under Crawford-El. Given the difficulty of proving intent even under a
preponderance standard, the clear-and-convincing evidence standard would likely have defeated most
Bivens claims. As noted in the text, however, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in
Crawford-El and invalidated the clear-and-convincing evidence standard for individual-capacity consti-
tutional tort cases. See 523 U.S. at 574.
117. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595.
118. See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897, 1925 & n.187 (1998)
(suggesting that Crawford-El puts an end to judicially fashioned heightened pleading requirements in
qualified immunity cases as well as heightened standards of proof).
119. 523 U.S. at 597-98 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819-20 n.35 (1981); Siegert,
500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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which the issue was raised. 2 '
In sum, it is only because Bivens liability runs in name against individual
defendants that qualified immunity and its related doctrines apply. The Court
justifies this special treatment on the theory that it is necessary to alleviate fears
of liability that would otherwise chill government officials from effectively
performing their jobs. The reality, however, is that the government is the entity
that, both predictably and actually, takes responsibility for paying the costs of
defending and resolving Bivens claims. If the government itself were recognized
to be the real defendant party in interest, the logic of Owen, Mitchell, and
Leatherman would render qualified immunity, interlocutory appeal rights, and
heightened pleading requirements inapplicable. The continued vitality of those
doctrines-at least as currently justified-therefore depends on the courts'
refusal to acknowledge that individual liability under Bivens has become fic-
tional.
B. NONDOCTRINAL EFFECTS OF BIVENS INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FICTION
Bivens's individual liability fiction and the qualified immunity doctrines that
it supports have had significant consequences for litigants, the government, and
society at large. In particular, the fiction has had anomalous effects on the
economic incentives of litigants and the government, created false symbolism,
harmed the institutional integrity of the government, and effectively halted
legislative reform of the law governing constitutional torts.
1. Economic Incentive Effects
The doctrinal outgrowths of the individual liability fiction dramatically affect
the economic incentive effects of individual, as compared with governmental,
liability. Two types of incentives are typically at stake in constructing a scheme
that responds to constitutional torts: (1) incentives for government employees to
do their jobs and pursue the public interest without being "overdeterred" by
fear of personal liability; and (2) incentives for victims of unconstitutional
conduct to seek a remedy and accordingly place deterrent pressures on govern-
ment and its employees to avoid and prevent constitutional harms. An efficient
constitutional tort system would prevent overdeterrence while maintaining suffi-
cient pressure on both governmental employers and their employees to take
cost-effective measures to prevent and avoid constitutional wrongdoing.
Economic theorists observe that, all else being equal, individual liability
becomes the functional equivalent of governmental liability in terms of net
outcomes. 21 As the economic analysis predicts, in the wake of Bivens the
120. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 462-65 (9th Cir. 1994). Some
cases in the D.C. Circuit have been held to have met heightened pleading, but they nonetheless
foundered on the alternative, higher standards the D.C. Circuit imposed. See, e.g., Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at
793-94; Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
121. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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government has responded to the individual liability rule by ensuring that its
officials are covered by indemnification, government representation, government-
subsidized insurance, and the like, thereby creating a regime of de facto
government liability.
But all else is not equal, and the economic equation of individual and
governmental liability under Bivens has broken down. The Supreme Court in
elaborating the doctrines described above has refused to take the reality of
indemnification into account. Two regimes-indemnification and qualified immu-
nity-are therefore each operating simultaneously, putatively to serve the same
end of shielding public employees. As an economic matter, however, they each
function quite differently. Indemnification policies allow plaintiffs to recover,
but shift responsibility for constitutional tort damages from the official to the govern-
ment. In 6ontrast, qualified immunity bars plaintiffs' recovery altogether, shifting the
risk of loss back onto the victim and leaving constitutional harms uncompensated.
These two parallel but distinct regimes-indemnification and qualified immu-
nity-create different sets of incentives. Either of the two regimes, taken alone,
would protect against chilling public employees' vigorous performance of their
duties, as qualified immunity would allow for dismissal of most suits and
indemnification would ensure that employees need not pay monetary judgments
or settlements out of their own pockets.12 2 In terms of plaintiffs' incentives to
sue, in contrast, the two regimes differ significantly. 123
A regime of indemnification (unaccompanied by qualified immunity) would
preserve such incentives by ensuring that, even while public employees' pockets
122. One might argue that qualified immunity, by eliminating not just employees' obligations to pay
but also forestalling liability findings flowing from their conduct, more effectively prevents overdeter-
rence. An employee who is fully reimbursed for monetary losses may still seek to avoid the risk to
reputation that comes from being a defendant in a civil rights lawsuit. One response to that concern,
however, is that if it were generally understood that under Bivens (as under Ex parte Young) individual
defendants function as stand-ins for the government, reputational harm to the individual would be
minimized. When a bureaucrat is personally sued for a failure to provide due process, for example, the
observing public fairly assumes that such lawsuits come with the job, and that the individual is not a
bad person for being formally held responsible. Another response to the concern about overdeterrence
flowing from risks to reputation is that, to the extent reputational harm persists even when the
government is known to be the real party in interest, a concern to shield defendants from such harm
would seem to require qualified immunity even in cases of governmental liability-such as municipal
liability under section 1983-because those cases are typically premised on the missteps of identified
government employees. The Court in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655-56 (1980),
however, held that qualified immunity is unwarranted in those cases, and the Court does not seem
poised to reconsider Owen. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405-06
(1997) (relying on Owen). Putting aside the reputational concerns, therefore, the two regimes both
appear adequately to serve an interest in avoiding public employee overdeterrence.
123. In other words, both systems seek to control "Type I error," or false positives, in which a
government employee is overdeterred by an inflated risk (or perception of risk) of a finding of
unconstitutionality. The indemnification approach does a better job than the qualified immunity
approach, however, of also controlling "Type II error," or false negatives, in which government actors
are not required to pay notwithstanding their violation of constitutional norms. For a discussion of this
economic terminology, see Lynn A. Stout, Type 1 Error Type II Error and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711-15 (1996).
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are protected, victims of unconstitutional conduct may still recover. Also, when
the government has to pay the costs of its employees' constitutional violations,
it will have an economic incentive to conform its employees' conduct to
constitutional norms. In contrast, a regime of qualified immunity from suit
eliminates, not only the public employee's liability, but the victim's compensa-
tion, and so critically blunts plaintiffs' incentives to sue. When litigation is
suppressed, government is likely to take less care to avoid unconstitutional
conduct. Qualified immunity and related doctrines thus substantially diminish
the level of deterrence against constitutional wrongdoing that application of substan-
tive constitutional standards, undiluted by qualified immunity, would produce.
Some would argue that ordinary tort models of deterrence are inapplicable to
the government for a variety of reasons, and therefore that one should not be
concerned that qualified immunity reduces deterrence of unconstitutional con-
duct. Granted, government agencies and departments may have substantial
noneconomic incentives, such as public oversight and political pressure, to
maintain economically efficient levels of compliance with the Constitution that
private corporations typically lack. For-profit entities, as opposed to governmen-
tal ones, may respond more reliably to monetary liabilities cutting into their
bottom lines.1 24 Nevertheless, governmental liability (not to mention the liabil-
ity of private, not-for-profit entities) is typically analyzed in deterrence terms. ,
25
Moreover, whereas the net deterrent effects that litigation imposes on govern-
ments as compared to private entities might differ, 126 in practice such effects are
often significant in both arenas.
The underlying economic challenge is to strike a balance that results in public
employees and their employers taking the optimal level of care. Perhaps such a
balance can never be perfectly struck, but the point here is simply that the
individual liability fiction substantially alters the economic incentive effects of
the current regime. And because that fiction is taken seriously, neither the Court
nor commentators have sought fully to address those effects.
2. Symbolic Effects
The individual liability fiction also confers symbolic benefits on the govern-
ment by hiding the presence of the government as the real party in interest. The
fiction affects both the courtroom narrative in constitutional tort cases and the
broader social perception of government as constrained by the Constitution.
By presenting an individual as the wrongdoer, the fiction has benefited the
124. Cf Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1997) (distinguishing private from public
prison administration on grounds that "government employees typically act within a different system"
from private employees-a system "often characterized by multidepartment civil service rules that,
while providing employee security, may limit the incentives of the ability of individual department or
supervisors flexibly to reward, or to punish, individual employees") (emphasis added).
125. See, e.g., Owen, 445 U.S. at 651.
126. Liability-driven deterrence of unconstitutional conduct by government actors would probably
be most effective if the liability were calibrated to run against the budget of the entity that is in the best
position to prevent similar constitutional violations. See SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 104-09.
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government by keeping government itself, with its disproportionate power and
resources, out of the dramatic picture that Bivens cases present to the courts and
the public. The fiction of individual liability means that the government itself is
not a party to constitutional tort suits. The governmental power that is, under the
state action doctrine, a necessary ingredient of constitutional misconduct is
pushed offstage. Instead, the litigation appears to be between private persons: an
individual government official, a public servant likely to be popular with judge
and jury, and the constitutional tort victim, often a federal prisoner, welfare
recipient, or other unsympathetic individual.
Public officials will often be viewed with favor for having devoted their
careers to public good rather than private gain, and jurors are unlikely to think
that "street level" public officials, who are the most frequent Bivens defendants,
have deep pockets. Jurors may therefore hesitate to find liability for fear of
putting at risk an official's car or mortgage payments, affecting his or her ability
to pay for children's college education and perhaps even causing personal
bankruptcy. Although officials are protected by indemnification, the government
has successfully argued that jurors should not be informed of the existence of
indemnification policies or, if they are, that they should be instructed that
defendant officials are not automatically entitled to indemnification.
The government benefits from the way the individual liability fiction hides
both its own role in wrongdoing and its deep pocket. For example, the Depart-
ment of Justice will not entertain an individual official's request for government
indemnification of a judgment or settlement amount "before entry of an adverse
verdict, judgment or award." 127 Thus, the government sends its employees into
litigation or settlement negotiations without any authority to pay out of govern-
ment funds, even though the government, rather than the individual, almost
inevitably ends up paying the costs associated with the litigation. Naturally, to
the extent that the decisionmakers believe that there is at least some real
possibility that a defendants' personal resources-rather than those of the
federal government-are at stake, the judgment or settlement is likely to be
smaller. Thus, due to the fiction's symbolic effect, liability is less likely to be
found and damage awards are likely to be smaller.
At the same time, Bivens enhances the image of the federal government as
one that operates within the bounds of the law, meaningfully constrained by the
Constitution. The nominal availability of Bivens claims makes the government
appear more constitutionally constrained than it really is and obscures the
remedial shortfall that might otherwise prompt calls for reform.' 28 This illusion
alleviates the tension that the Bivens Court faced between a system of constitu-
tional rights and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
127. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)(3) (1999).
128. To be sure, qualified immunity has come under a great deal of scholarly and even judicial
criticism. But the critiques have focused on the boundaries of the doctrine and its unfairness to
constitutional tort victims; they have not identified the confusion and anomalies created by the
individual liability fiction as the root of the problem.
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The illusion that damages are meaningfully available under Bivens depends
on misperceptions about qualified immunity. At least superficially, qualified
immunity appears more modest than it is. Although it has operated as a virtually
complete bar to recovery, it seems to create a much more limited obstacle to
constitutional relief than does sovereign immunity. The message of Harlow
appears to be that only a narrow category of the most cutting-edge constitu-
tional claims will be barred as too new. In practice, however, Anderson has
ensured that "clearly established" rights are the rare exception, not the rule.
Reliance on qualified immunity, rather than sovereign immunity, allows the
government to look less authoritarian than it may be when no effective relief is
available for constitutional torts.12 9 Moreover, when the government seeks
broad qualified immunity protection on behalf of its officials in court, it
highlights not its own unremediable abuses of power, but rather its role as a
solicitous employer seeking the protections its anxious employees need to do
their jobs.
In sum, the individual liability fiction has provided the government with both
the pragmatic benefits of sovereign immunity and the ideological benefits of
perceived government accountability. Under Bivens, the government enjoys
virtually complete immunity from liability for damages without having to
justify application of sovereign immunity to constitutional violations. Thus,
although Bivens has consistently been hailed as a development beneficial to
plaintiffs and to the full remediation of constitutional violations, it has proved to
be a progovernment decision, enhancing the prestige of both the executive
branch and the courts at the expense of constitutional tort victims.
3. Institutional Effects
Bivens's individual liability fiction also creates institutional confusion and
malfunction. When government lawyers defend federal employees who are sued
in their personal capacities, the government's traditional case-assessment calcu-
lus is thrown off, and to some extent the government lawyers who defend
federal officials must shed their "governmental voice." In non-Bivens cases in
which the government itself is formally the litigating party, the Justice Depart-
129. Harlow also appeared to create a merely temporary bar against any given type of claim,
pending clarification of constitutional standards, but has actually helped to forestall such clarification.
Because courts have generally decided the qualified immunity issue first, the doctrine has allowed
courts to reject constitutional claims without even reaching their merits. The Court's recent decision in
Wilson v. Layne promises to change that, however, by mandating that "[a] court evaluating a claim of
qualified immunity 'must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual
constitutional right at all.' " 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292,
1295 (1999)). Wilson's directive is itself problematic, appearing to authorize (and even require)
advisory opinions and contradicting the principle of avoidance of unnecessary decisions of constitu-
tional issues. But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984) (approving determination of
Fourth Amendment issue before decision whether officers' good faith precludes application of exclusion-
ary rule). Wilson may, however, prompt clarification of legal standards and thereby limit the number of
times a given type of unlawful conduct will go unredressed.
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ment assesses its potential litigation positions not only in terms of how well
they serve the government's immediate interests-such as an agency's program-
matic interests or the government's interest in saving costs-but also in terms of
whether they serve the broader interests of society. Ideally, Justice Department
lawyers are not simply "hired guns" for a client, but civil servants acting for the
people as a whole in upholding the nation's laws, and its legal positions are
designed to take the public interest into account. 130 In contrast, when Justice
Department lawyers represent individual defendant officials in Bivens cases,
they approach cases differently; they must behave more like private lawyers, as
they are ethically bound to serve their individual clients' personal interests. 131
Federal regulations require that government representation of Bivens defen-
dants cease if such representation should conflict with the government's inter-
ests, 132 but a subtle, structural conflict between a government lawyer's fidelity
to the government versus her fidelity to an individual employee is always
present. Whereas the Justice Department might advocate a more individufl-rights-
protective interpretation of a constitutional provision if the government itself
were the defendant, the Bivens individual liability fiction creates pressure (or
cover) to seek narrower interpretations of constitutional provisions and broader.
defenses. 33 Justice Department lawyers know that officials are protected by govern-
mental representation and indemnification, but they also see how officials' role as
even nominal defendants under Bivens personally affects those who are sued in their
individual capacities. In a unique way-one that is borne of identification with
defendant officials-the Justice Department lawyers, too, take the fiction seriously.
Moreover, the standard employed by the government to determine whether it
will represent and indemnify officials sued under Bivens discourages public
employees from pointing the finger at government and instead urges them to
130. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, IIl, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L.
REv. 73, 81 (1995). The Solicitor General may deny approval of, and therefore bar, an appeal by any
federal government person or entity if the Solicitor General concludes that the government's overall
interests are thus better served, even if the particular governmental actor (for example, an agency,
commission, or prosecutor) wants to appeal. The Solicitor General may for similar reasons confess
error and decline to defend a lower court victory.
131. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(3) (1999). Justice Department attorneys who represent an employee
under this section also undertake a full and traditional attorney-client relationship with the employee
with respect to the attorney-client privilege.
132. Conflicts among the interests of federal officials who are jointly sued, or between the interests
of the United States and a defendant official, can in theory be mediated by the appointment of private
counsel at governmental expense. See 28 C.FR. § 50.15(a)(10) (conflict with interests of other
defendant officials); § 50.15(a)(11) (conflict with interests of United States); § 50.16 (standards for
appointment of private counsel). Payment for private counsel can be denied, however, where providing
private representation is not in the interests of the United States. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.16(c)(2)(iv). In any
event, reimbursement of private counsel fees "is not available for legal work that advances only the
individual interests of the employee." 28 C.F.R. § 50.16(d)(1).
133. Although the government in its Supreme Court briefs routinely recites that its interests in
Bivens cases are both to ensure adequate remediation and deterrence of unconstitutional conduct and to
ensure adequate protection of public officials seeking to do their jobs, the government's bottom line has
almost without exception sought narrower interpretations of constitutional rights and of the Bivens
remedy and broader interpretations of qualified immunity and other defensive measures.
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close ranks with their superiors. This effect derives from the strong interest a
government official sued in his individual capacity has in ensuring that the
government will exercise its discretion to provide him with representation and
to indemnify him in the event of a judgment or settlement. Because the
government will represent employees only when the employees' interests are
not in conflict with those of the United States, Bivens defendants face inevitable
pressures to align themselves with the government's institutional interests and
thereby maximize their chance of attaining the valuable benefits of government
representation and indemnification.
Another institutional by-product of the individual liability fiction is the
tremendous volume of Bivens claims processed by the government and the
courts. The Civil Division of the Justice Department has a branch devoted
specifically to defending constitutional tort litigation, and it is currently process-
ing over 5,000 pending claims. 134 Given the extremely low rate of recovery
under Bivens, this huge volume of lawsuits is, by traditional measures of
litigation success, a fruitless and wasteful exercise.1 35 Insofar as Bivens creates
an illusion that recovery is available where it is not, it also encourages the filing
of claims that are destined to fail. There are many factors that contribute to the
persistence of Bivens filings despite their low financial yield for plaintiffs. It is
fair to say that among those factors is the obfuscatory quality of the current
Bivens regime.1 36 If the Court in Bivens had simply held that sovereign immu-
nity bars recovery for constitutional torts, and had not implied a remedy against
officials in their individual capacities, constitutional tort victims presumably
would have learned quite quickly and directly that damages relief is unavailable
and would have stopped filing such claims.
It is, at least in part, the relative ambiguity and incompleteness of the
qualified immunity bar, in contrast to a categorical and complete defense like
sovereign immunity, that tempts litigants to brave the odds. While the lack of
clarity about which specific claims will merit qualified immunity obscures the
134. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division Brochure (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://
www.usdoj.gov/civil/brochure/index.html>.
135. In order to conclude otherwise, one would have to find that an efficient level of deterrence. is
created by individual officials being very often subject to suit but seldom subject to monetary judgment
or settlement. It is possible that the mere fact of having one's conduct challenged in litigation, and of
facing the admittedly remote possibility of an adverse judgment, will deter officials to some extent, but
it hardly seems the most efficient or calibrated way to go about it.
136. Other factors helping to explain why people continue to file Bivens cases, even though they are
destined to fail, include that many Bivens plaintiffs are uncounseled federal prisoners and public interest
organizations representing plaintiffs who may be less cost-sensitive and more willing to take a case to
make a point, such as to air publicly allegations of unconstitutional conduct. Uncounseled prisoners
may lack the requisite knowledge for accurate case assessment and, in any event, lack other rewarding
activities competing for their attention. They may also reap psychic benefits from invoking the federal
legal system against their captors; they can at least make them squirm if they cannot ultimately make
them pay. This is not to suggest that prisoner claims necessarily lack merit; many undoubtedly do, but it
is also the case that because prisoners live in institutions under governmental coercion and away from
public scrutiny, they are particularly vulnerable to abuses of governmental power.
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extent to which it bars recovery of damages, it also fails to provide government
officials with the assurances they need to act with confidence when carrying out
their official duties. Federal government officials are protected from constitu-
tional tort liability by defendant-protective legal doctrines, representation and
indemnification policies, and the availability of insurance to cover residual
risks. Ironically, however, uncertainty remains about the extent to which individu-
als can be personally liable under Bivens. If officials take the fiction seriously,
they will have substantial concerns about exposure that they would lack under
an exclusive regime of official-capacity liability. As noted above, the current
regime may have legitimating benefits for the government that a regime of
absolute sovereign immunity would lack. The government purchases those
benefits, however, at the expense of its own employees' peace of mind.' 37
4. Political Effects
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens argued that Congress, not
the Court, should have taken the initiative to create a damage remedy for
constitutional violations. 138 Burger believed that if the Court denied a damage
remedy, popular opinion would have pressured Congress to enact one.' 39 He
even took the extraordinary step of sketching out a recommended federal statute
waiving sovereign immunity and authorizing constitutional claims for damages
directly against the government.' 40 Given the majority's decision, we cannot
know what Congress would have done if the Bivens Court had decided as
Burger wished. However, we do know that the Bivens decision has subsequently
contributed to the failure of legislative efforts to make the government directly
accountable for constitutional torts. Because Bivens created at least the illusion
of a remedy, it relieved pressure that otherwise might have prompted Congress
to authorize damages for constitutional violations. More pertinent here, the
individual liability fiction appears to have been responsible for the final dead-
lock in the most serious legislative effort to date.
137. It is impossible to know how much anxiety Bivens continues to elicit among federal officials.
Some of the advocacy over a decade ago in favor of the bills to amend the FTCA focused on perceived
overdeterrent effects of Bivens on federal officials. The point here is simply that, to the extent that
individuals are used as a proxy for government under Bivens but the fiction is nonetheless taken
seriously, the individuals inevitably bear some psychic burdens that they otherwise would not.
138. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
411-12, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 427 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
fatal weakness in the Court's judgment is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted
legislation creating such a right of action. For us to do so is, in my judgment, an exercise of power that
the Constitution does not give us."); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (" [I]t is the Congress and not
this Court that should act.").
139. See 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Quoting Thayer, the Chief Justice asserted that
the Court, if it refrained from "undertaking a function not its own," could "help, as nothing else can, to
fix the spot where responsibility lies, and to bring down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of
popular condemnation." Id. (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, & FELIX
FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 88 (Phoenix ed., 1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See id. at 422-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger's recommended statute notably included no
special rules like those established in Harlow and Mitchell.
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Between 1973 and 1985, twenty-one bills were introduced in Congress
seeking to replace individual liability under Bivens with direct governmental
liability; only three were reported to committee, and none was successful, 
4
'
The bills were refined successively as various controversies were worked out
and compromises reached. No bill seeking to improve Bivens's approach to
constitutional tort liability and immunity has been introduced since 1985.
It is difficult to know precisely why the legislative efforts ultimately failed,
but two points stand out. First, there has been unanimous support for governmen-
tal liability for constitutional torts among all interested parties testifying on this
kind of legislation. The executive branch,' 42 organizations representing public
officials, 14 3 civil liberties organizations," 44 and other commentators 145 have all
favored legislation providing for substitution of the United States in place of
individual defendant officials. Second, when the issue came to a head, the
executive branch would not support any bill that did not also permit the
government to raise qualified immunity in its own defense. 14 6 Civil liberties
141. See Thomas J. Madden & Nicholas W. Allard, Bedtime for Bivens: Substituting the United
States as Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 470, 476 n.23 (1983) (16 bills
by 1982, with only three forwarded to committee and none reported out of committee). After Madden
and Allard completed their study, five more unsuccessful bills were introduced: S. 492, 99th Cong.
(1985); H.R. 440, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 829, 98th Cong. (1983); S.775, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 595,
98th Cong. (1983).
142. See, e.g., Title XIII of S. 829: To Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on S. 829 Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 6
(1983) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 829] (testimony of William Webster, Director of the FBI); id. at
10-11 (testimony of Roscoe L. Egger, Commissioner of Internal Revenue); id. at 28 (testimony of Paul
McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division); id. at 27-38 (testimony of A. James Barnes,
General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture); see also id. at 17 (testimony of Loren A.
Smith, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States); Hearings on H.R. 595, supra note
5, at 116 (statement of Thomas J. Madden, Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler, and
author of report on Bivens for Administrative Conference).
143. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 829, supra note 142, at 96 (statement of Bun Bray, Executive Director
of the Federal Managers' Association); id. at 97 (statement of Jerry Shaw, General Counsel, Senior
Executive Association and Chairman, Federal Employees' Coordinating Committee); id. at 114 (state-
ment of Jack Solerwitz, General Counsel, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association); id. at 113
(Statement of Lawrence A. Cresce, President, Association of Federal Investigators).
144. See, e.g., id. at 121 (statement of Jerry J. Berman, American Civil Liberties Union); Hearings
on H.R. 595, supra note 5, at 57, 65 (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director of Litigation, Public
Citizen Litigation Group).
145. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 829, supra note 142, at 140-41 (statement of Kenneth Culp Davis).
146. The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division under President Reagan argued
in favor of qualified immunity for the United States on grounds similar to those in Justice Powell's
dissent in Owen, including that government could face massive liability for actions not understood at
the time to be unconstitutional. See Hearings on H.R. 595, supra note 5, at 28. Oddly, the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States and then-FBI director William Webster argued in favor of qualified
immunity on the ground that, without it, the government would face "strict liability." Hearings on S.
829, supra note 142, at 17 (testimony of Loren Smith) (reporting that the Administrative Conference
was divided over the issue, but favored the government retaining qualified immunity on the ground that
deterrence depends on employee consciousness of misconduct, and, in the absence of qualified
immunity, there would be strict liability for constitutional torts); id. at 7-8 (testimony of William
Webster) (suggesting that, in the absence of qualified immunity, there would be a system "akin to a
no-fault compensation system"). Liability under the Constitution would not, of course, be strict, but
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groups and other commentators reasoned that, if liability were governmental
rather than individual, qualified immunity would be inappropriate. 47 In addi-
tion, most of the groups representing public employees, such as their unions,
were willing to forego qualified immunity in order to ensure the legislation's
passage.' 48 The executive branch, however, did not accept that approach. The
ACLU characterized the government's insistence on retaining qualified immu-
nity as the principal obstacle to enacting legislation authorizing constitutional
tort claims directly against the United States. 49 The political story therefore
suggests that the majoritarian branches have been unwilling to act in the broader
interests of both constitutional tort victims and government officials if doing so
means foregoing the benefits that the individual liability fiction confers on
government.
We cannot know for sure what Congress would have done had the Court
affirmed the appellate decision in Bivens. Given that the government appears to
prefer individual rather than governmental liability, Congress might well have
responded simply by enacting an individual liability regime, that is, a legislated
Bivens. 150 It is also plausible, however, that the coalition in favor of governmen-
tal liability would have succeeded in urging Congress to provide for governmen-
tal liability, and, given the individual-focused rationales for qualified immunity,
Congress would have afforded no such immunity for the government. In other
words, it may be that the existence of the judicially fashioned Bivens remedy
decisively diminished momentum behind a political response, but that Congress
would have acted in the absence of that judicial remedy and would have waived
sovereign immunity to provide for a damages cause of action directly against
the government fisc.' 51 If Bivens reduced political pressure for such an out-
come, the decision in that way, too, has proved to be progovernment.
would require proof meeting the relevant constitutional standard (for example, intent to discriminate in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, intent to burden protected speech in violation of the First Amendment, or reckless
disregard under the Eighth Amendment). The Carter Administration, in contrast, supported legislation
that did not include qualified immunity for the government. See Amendment of the Federal Tort Claims
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 123 (1979), 3-4 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti);
Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 4 (1978) (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
147. See Hearings on S. 829, supra note 142, at 138 (statement of Kenneth Culp Davis) (arguing
that "the justification for deciding against the plaintiff [on qualified immunity grounds] disappears
when the government is the defendant; the government should be liable for wrongful action, despite
both reasonableness and good faith").
148. See, e.g., id. at 95, 98 (Shaw and Bray); id. at 104 (Solerwitz); id. at 191 (Hughes); but see id.
at 99-100 (testimony of Ordway Burden, Chairman, National Law Enforcement Council).
149. See id. at 123.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44 and accompanying text. Or perhaps it might have
adopted a scheme for federal actors that mirrors section 1983 as it applies to municipal actors, relying
principally on individual liability, with governmental liability available under only limited circum-
stances.
151. For example, the APA, enacted in the wake of Bivens, might have encompassed a damages
remedy if the Court had not already created one. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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5. Effects on the Courts' Normative Analysis
Finally, and most importantly, in addition to the practical effects discussed
above, the Court's preservation of the individual liability fiction has allowed it
to avoid candid discussion of the normative questions underlying constitutional
tort litigation. This article has argued that in the quarter century since Bivens,
the Court has at least purported to take the individual liability fiction seriously
and has relied on it to develop practically impermeable doctrinal protections for
Bivens defendants. That doctrinal approach has obscured the fundamental norma-
tive questions posed by constitutional tort litigation.
There are three central normative dilemmas raised by constitutional tort
litigation that the Bivens Court at least partially sidestepped: (1) whether
damages should be available for constitutional torts, or whether they should, in
the absence of clear congressional action, be wholly precluded by sovereign
immunity; (2) if damages are available, who should pay them-the individual
government official, or the government itself; and (3) if the government pays,
whether any limited or qualified immunity should be available to it. The Court
has implicitly provided bottom-line answers to these questions, but has done so
in an indirect way and thereby avoided the need to justify its results norma-
tively. 152
The individual liability fiction of Bivens has allowed the Court to leave the
sovereign immunity principle undisturbed. Especially as applied to remedies for
constitutional violations, however, the validity of sovereign immunity is subject
to serious question.1 53 The Court could have acknowledged that the federal
agents in Bivens were acting in their official capacities and therefore might have
either permitted relief notwithstanding sovereign immunity, or barred it based
152. To be sure, the Court adheres to Bivens and its sovereign and official immunity doctrines for
reasons that are not purely normative, including common-law and constitutional history, structure,
principle, and, by now, stare decisis. Normative concerns have also, however, consistently played a
significant role in these areas of constitutional liability and immunity. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (observing that Harlow "completely reformulated qualified immunity along
principles not at all embodied in the common law"); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
651-52 (1980) (taking into account, inter alia, normative concerns for deterrence, remediation, and
loss-spreading, etc.). The argument here is addressed to those normative aspects of the Court's analysis.
153. The anomaly of importing such a doctrine into the American constitutional system is com-
pounded by what Professor Louis Jaffe refers to as "a magnificent irony" that the American version of
sovereign immunity is even broader than the original common law version. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrToN 197 (1965); see also Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d
457, 458-59 (Cal. 1961) (quoting Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924)
("At the earliest common law" sovereign immunity "only rarely had the effect of completely denying
compensation. How it became in the United States the basis for a rule that the federal and state
governments did not have to answer for their torts has been called 'one of the mysteries of legal
evolution.' "). Justice Stevens has argued that sovereign immunity is inappropriate to the American
constitutional system because it depends on a theory of divine right of kings, under which the sovereign
is not subject to legal constraint but only to the "higher court" of God. John Paul Stevens, Is Justice
Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121 (1991); see also Amar supra note 45, at 1427 ("no govemment entity can
enjoy plenary 'sovereign' immunity from a suit alleging a violation of a constitutional right"). Cf. Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2269 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting the view that state sovereign
immunity is an inherent and indefeasible right of statehood implicit in the Constitution).
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on that principle. As it was, the Court neither justified the inapplicability of
sovereign immunity to constitutional tort claims, nor offered any rationale for
allowing sovereign immunity to stand as a bar to recovery for constitutional
torts. The individual liability fiction so effectively circumvented the issue
whether sovereign immunity should apply that the majority opinion saw no
need even to mention it. Apparently the Court tacitly accepted Justice Harlan's
conclusion in his concurring opinion that "[h]owever desirable a direct remedy
against the Government might be as a substitute for individual official liability,
the sovereign still remains immune to suit." 154 It was not until a quarter century
later that the Court actually stated that sovereign immunity applies to bar not
only state common-law and statutory claims, but federal constitutional claims as
well. 155 By that time, however, the Court treated the issue as a foregone
conclusion not worthy of reasoned discussion.
A second normative question that Bivens's individual liability fiction helped
the Court to avoid was whether and to what extent liability for constitutional
torts should be imposed on the government or on the individual tortfeasors.
Because the Court has not acknowledged the degree to which the current regime
is in practice one of governmental liability, it has never justified that regime.
The Court has instead defended Bivens as if it stands for the proposition that
exclusive officer liability provides the best deterrent in all cases.' 56 That analy-
sis is not accurately descriptive, because individual liability can be and has been
shifted to the government by means of indemnification. The Court's stated
preference for individual liability as the best deterrent is also not effectively
proscriptive, because the Court has not prohibited the shifting of liability. An
ideal regime might be one in which governmental liability is the norm, 5 7 with a
narrow category of intentional misconduct subject to a rule of nonshiftable
individual liability. Or perhaps the best rule would mirror rules in private tort
law, under which an employer and its employees are jointly and severally liable
for wrongdoing. Because it has relied on the individual liability fiction, how-
ever, and chosen not to grapple with the realities of governmental liability, the
Court has never openly sorted out the appropriate roles for governmental and
individual liability.
Finally, the Court has refused to acknowledge that qualified immunity oper-
ates in practice to protect the government fisc, and it therefore has never
justified the de facto extension of qualified immunity to government. As ex-
154. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971).
155. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
156. See id. at 485-86; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) ("Because the Bivens remedy is
recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the [Federal Tort Claims Act]
remedy against the U.S.").
157. See, e.g., Kramer & Sykes, supra note 49, at 251, 284-87, 293-94, 301 (proposing, in the
distinct but analogous context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, vicarious governmental liability based on negli-
gence, that is, a rule imposing liability on the government only to the extent that it failed to institute
available and efficient means to prevent the violation).
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plained above, the Court's development of qualified immunity has consistently
relied on the notion that government officials need protection from the burdens
of litigation and unforeseeable liability in order to free them from fear of
personal damages liability and its inhibiting effects. That justification does not
apply, however, once it is understood that the government can and does serve
the same purposes through its representation and indemnification policies.
Given that government addresses the prospect of its employees incurring per-
sonal liability by consistently shouldering the costs of constitutional tort claims
against them, that purpose no longer supports also applying qualified immunity
to those same officials. In the context of indemnification, the practical function
of qualified immunity is, in effect, to provide the government with a defense.
But the Court has not only failed to justify application of qualified immunity
directly to protect the government, it has affirmatively disavowed the appropriate-
ness of any such application. Ultimately, by creating the individual liability
fiction and maintaining qualified immunity, the Court has bolstered the system
of sovereign immunity it purported to circumvent. Moreover, by perpetuating
the fiction of individual liability, it has precluded itself, as well as society at
large, from ever having to make the choice of whether the government should
truly be held responsible for the constitutional violations of its agents.
This article does not purport to resolve the normative problems identified
here. Its goal is the more modest one of describing anomalies that the individual
liability fiction has generated, including the degree to which the fiction has
undermined the effectiveness of the Bivens remedy from plaintiffs' perspective
and boosted the federal government's institutional interests in appearing account-
able while avoiding liability. Perhaps this article will help to set the stage for a
more coherent and accurate normative analysis than the courts have thus far
undertaken. "
A more candid approach in the first instance might have led the Court to
grapple expressly with whether sovereign immunity is applicable to constitu-
tional claims. By appearing to provide a workable remedy, individual liability
under Bivens may have helped to forestall judicial abandonment of sovereign
immunity and may also have taken pressure off of Congress to waive it. If the
courts candidly took account of the reality of liability shifting onto the govern-
ment, they might fashion narrower qualified immunity doctrines 58 or abandon
them altogether,15 9 afford fewer special procedural protections to Bivens defen-
dants, and permit juries to learn of indemnification and representation arrange-
ments.
Even if we believe that history and precedent now constrain the Court from
adopting a normatively ideal regime,1 60 or if we are satisfied with the patterns
158. Some commentators suggest that qualified immunity should be more narrowly framed. See,
e.g., V6zquez, supra note 44, at 1801; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 1797.
159. The Court's decision in Owen v. City of Independence provides some possible rationales for
nonapplication of qualified immunity to government entities.
160. For example, strong as arguments may be against application of the common-law doctrine of
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of liability produced under the current constitutional tort system,' 6 ' we should
be concerned with the lack of judicial candor along the way. 162 The mismatch
between the courts' persistent rhetoric of individual liability and the reality of
governmental liability under Bivens impairs the courts' credibility.
Judicial candor is essential to the process of justification, or reasoned elabora-
tion, that is at the heart of judicial legitimacy. 163 The expectation that courts
give genuine and persuasive reasons for their decisions helps to constrain
judicial power. There are important legitimacy issues at the heart of the current
Bivens regime, including questions regarding the source of courts' authority to
cut back on constitutional causes of action with judge-made exceptions and
limitations such as qualified immunity, heightened pleading, and interlocutory
appeals. Those questions are exacerbated when the stated rationale for those
doctrines-the availability of immunity at common law for defendant offi-
cials-is inapposite to the de facto defendant: the government. If courts believe
that the existence of sovereign immunity makes it unproblematic to use quali-
fied immunity in a way that approximates sovereign immunity and actually
protects the government, they have not yet frankly said so.
Judicial candor also fosters public trust in outcomes. That virtue is particu-
larly important in constitutional litigation, where the lawfulness of the use of
public power against marginal and often disaffected persons is at issue. Rational-
izing the expansive use of qualified immunity as a protection of officials'
pocketbooks and engaging in the litigation pretense that defendants appear in
their personal capacities breeds cynicism when individual liability is a fiction.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Bivens purported to take constitutional rights seriously and
therefore prescribed a damages remedy. But in designing that remedy, the Court
sidestepped the most difficult issues in constitutional tort law by imposing
liability on individual government employees rather than on government itself.
Some have argued that this was Bivens's genius; the Court foresaw that indemni-
fication would follow and therefore created governmental liability without
sovereign immunity to constitutional (as opposed to common law) claims, it seems a long shot at this
stage to argue that the Court should curtail sovereign immunity and authorize constitutional tort suits
directly against the government by overruling FDIC v. Meyer
161. Some scholarship generally supports the existing regime by supplying rationales the Court has
not itself elaborated. See generally, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused,
51 VAND. L. REv. 583 (1998); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections
on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82 (1989); Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris,
Defending a Maligned Defense: The Policy Bases of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 665 (1992).
162. See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731 (1987).
163. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 161, 165-68, 487 (tentative ed. 1958); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 366 (1978) (discussing importance of reasoned argument
as an element of adjudication).
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entering the difficult thicket of sovereign immunity and confronting the question
of whether liability should be imposed on the government itself. But since that
decision, the Court has taken the individual liability fiction seriously and as a
result has provided ever broader defendants' protections, all of which foresee-
ably redound to the benefit of government itself.
Bivens's individual liability fiction has had anomalous and inadequately
justified effects on the constitutional tort system. The fiction has sustained a
regime in which we have, without fully knowing it, come full circle to the
situation of constitutional rights without remedies. Bivens may have overstated
its promise of full remediation. But in holding out that promise and then scaling
it back in a manner that has been less than candid, the Court has impaired our
ability to debate, criticize, and remedy the Court's implicit choices.
